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Abstract. It is argued that medical science requires a classificatory system that 
(a) puts functions in the taxonomic center and (b) does justice ontologically to 
the difference between the processes which are the realizations of functions and 
the objects which are their bearers. We propose formulae for constructing such 
a system and describe some of its benefits. The arguments are general enough 
to be of interest to all the life sciences. 
1 Traditional Anatomy and Functional Anatomy  
The idea to be outlined in this paper is that there is an as yet unexplored taxonomical 
approach within the life sciences, in particular within medicine, which we call pure 
functional anatomy. Pure functional anatomy is complementary to the purely 
structural approach to anatomy exemplified by the Foundational Model of Anatomy 
(Cornelius and Mejino, 2003), while at the same time remaining distinct from pure 
physiology. Physicians as well as medical scientists are of course already working 
with a large amount of more or less implicit knowledge of functional anatomy. Our 
proposal is that this knowledge be made explicit and that it be carefully systematized 
in the form of a new kind of taxonomy. 
On one traditional conception, anatomy describes only the structures of the body, 
leaving functions and processes to physiology. The aim of anatomy, on this 
conception, is to divide the human body into its spatial parts by reference to the 
physico-chemical composition and spatial arrangement of these parts, including 
topological relations such as adjacency and connectedness. Even to the very earliest 
anatomists, it must have been apparent that the various organs in the body such as the 
lungs, heart, and kidneys are composed of different kinds of material. And it was easy 
to view the skeletal system as a spatial coordinate system in relation to which all other 
anatomical entities could be assigned their places.   
Philosophers often say “no entity without identity.” But one can equally, for 
entities in space and time, say that there is “no entity without boundary.” What, then, 
determines the boundaries of anatomical entities? For many of them, for example the 
separate bones of the foot, anatomists select a pre-existing discontinuity in the 
physico-chemical composition of reality – between the material entity on the one 
hand and its surroundings (including a liquid medium) on the other. But when it 
comes to parts of entities made of more homogeneous material, the boundaries must 
of course be determined in some other way. They have to be in some sense a product 
of our demarcation as, for example, they are when speak of the upper and the lower 
portions of the femur. In other words, some boundaries in the body are bona fide and 
some are fiat (Smith, 2001). Similarly, when a part of the body recognized by 
anatomists is made up of non-connected parts (e.g., the endocrine system) then here, 
too, the circumcluding boundary must be a product of our demarcation. Many 
anatomical parts such as the skull, the ribs, the chest bone, and the pelvis have a 
boundary that is partly bona fide and partly fiat. Often, such mixed boundaries are 
constituted by a large bona fide portion complemented by a small fiat boundary drawn 
for example at the point where organs are connected via conduits for the passage of 
substances in or out. 
But there is also another way to determine spatial boundaries. One can select 
boundaries in such a way that the entity delineated is a function bearer, that is, a unity 
which as a whole performs a certain function. The musculoskeletal system is not a 
unity from a structural point of view, but from a functional point of view it is. The 
muscles and skeleton are grouped together because their unity is what bears the 
function: to move the body.  
Of course, many functions are such that their bearers are single anatomical parts 
already structurally discerned (the heart has the function to pump blood, the liver has 
the function to produce glycogen, and so on). Our point is that this is not the case for 
all functions.  If we are correct, then it follows that there are two differently 
demarcated kinds of anatomical parts in the body: spatial-structural parts and spatial-
functional parts. Each can ground an anatomy of its own, notwithstanding the fact that 
some parts are simultaneously both spatial-structural and spatial-functional. We will 
call the results of such demarcation pure structural anatomy and pure functional 
anatomy, respectively. These anatomies are both partonomies and taxonomies, i.e., 
the spatial parts discerned are also given either a structural or a functional description. 
Many anatomical textbooks, old as well as new, can be conceived as being neither 
purely structural nor purely functional, for they contain demarcations with mixed 
motivations. When, for instance, the heart muscle is regarded as a part of the 
circulatory system rather than of the muscle system, this seems not to reflect an 
essential structural difference between this muscle and the other muscles. 
The term “functional anatomy” is widely used. As this paper is being finalized 
(November, 2004), Google™ lists 119.000 entries for this term. There are papers 
about the functional anatomy of limbs, of the knee-joint, of the hypothalamus, and 
many more. Thus far, however, there seems to exist no clear statement of the 
principles governing functional anatomy, indeed of what the word ‘functional,’ and of 
cognate words such as ‘regulation,’ ‘inhibition,’ and ‘promotion’ might mean. We 
thus believe that the construction of a purely functional anatomy can be of more than 
merely taxonomic interest. By helping to throw light on the meaning of ‘function’ it 
can have implications for our understanding of a range of important contemporary 
developments in the life sciences, for example as are clustered around the enterprise 
of ‘functional genomics.’ It can contribute also – and no less importantly – to our 
understanding of clinical medicine (which is focused at least in part on the alleviation 
of malfunctions). Even medical technology might benefit, since artificial body parts 
are meant to preserve old functions with the help of new structures. 
 2 
2 Constituent Functions 
Function talk seems to come naturally to people who know a lot about the human 
body and its parts. Many philosophers of science claim nevertheless that such talk 
should be reduced to what they conceive as ‘teleology-free’ talk of causality or 
natural selection (see section 6.2 below). Their reasoning turns on the fact that 
functions would be features of objects directed in some sense towards even a distant 
future, and such features make no sense in a scientific world view. They reflect, 
rather, an anthropomorphic imputation. We think, however, that the proposed 
reduction of function talk is not feasible, and that there is a non-reducible notion of 
function, which we will call constituent function, that reflects an objective feature of 
the world. The notion we have in mind might also have been expressed by means of 
terms such as ‘component function’ or ‘part-to-whole function.’ What all these terms 
have in common is that they help us keep in mind that constituent functions are in 
every case relational in character (Johansson, 2006).  
As point of departure for our taxonomic proposal, we have taken the human body 
regarded as a functional unit whose short-term function we can think of provisionally 
as: to preserve the life of the organism. Relative to this function of life-preservation 
most bodily functions are constituent functions, i.e., they are functions in virtue of 
their relation to this larger whole. What we mean when we say that the function of the 
heart is to pump blood is that the heart, when inside a living body, both acts and has a 
disposition to act in a certain way to contribute to the realization of this larger 
function on the part of that whole organism which is its host.  
It follows from this account that an entity does not have a constituent function in 
and of itself in the way in which, for example, mass is assumed to inhere in 
Newtonian corpuscles or human conscious intentions are assumed to inhere in 
persons. Functions that are objective monadic properties in this sense, we call 
intrinsic functions. It is functions of this sort which have been the targets of standard 
attempts at reduction. We here leave open the question whether such intrinsic 
functions exist, noting only that it is at least in principle possible for an entity to be 
the bearer of both intrinsic and constituent functions. 
In light of these remarks we can now advance a first revision of the provisional 
account of the function of the whole (living) human body given above. For we now 
see that the latter can be regarded either: 
(a) as a constituent function of a functional unit that is larger than the human body; 
(b) as an intrinsic function of the human body; or 
(c) as some sort of a projection, i.e., as a feature that is merely imputed to the 
human body by perceiving and language-using human beings, but which 
corresponds to no underlying feature of reality. 
None of these options is without its corresponding problems. If, as according to (a), 
the human body has its function of preserving life only if it is itself part of some 
larger functional whole, then what is to be said about that whole and its function? An 
infinite regress arises if one allows for constituent functions only. Therefore, from a 
philosophical point of view, at some stage we have to bring the chain of ever larger 
circumcluding wholes to an end, and then we face a choice between options (b) 
and (c).  
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If we choose (b), we are confronted with the problem of how to make intrinsic 
functions consistent with natural science. If the human organism in and of itself has at 
a certain point in time the function to preserve its life for some time to come, then the 
organism as a causal-energetic whole must somehow be able to be directed towards 
these as yet non-existing points of time. Ordinary vectors such as velocity and 
acceleration are not like this. They are directed only toward the very next instant of 
time, not toward anything temporally more distant. Option (b) therefore seems to 
make functions too similar to conscious human intentions to be parts of natural 
science.  
Third, if we opt for (c), as for instance John Searle (1995) and Mohan Matthen 
(1997) do, we seem to license some sort of cultural relativity or even personal 
subjectivity to enter into science.  
Quite a trilemma. How to choose between (a) an infinite regress, (b) an 
anthropomorphizing of nature, and (c) subjectivity? Our solution is simple, since it is 
of the cutting-the-Gordian-knot variety. We claim that, independently of whether or 
not the self-preservation of the whole human body is itself either a constituent 
function, an intrinsic property of the body, or only a projected feature, still all of the 
constituent functions of the body are objective features of the world. This move 
suffices to make functional anatomy a tractable scientific enterprise.  
Perhaps an analogy can give further credence to our view that constituent functions 
are objective. As an action can be objectively rational in its relation (as a means) to a 
pre-given end – even if this end is itself completely irrational – so a spatial part can be 
objectively functional in its relation to an encompassing pre-given functional whole 
even if the corresponding function of the whole is not an objective intrinsic function 
but rather a mere subjective projection (Johansson, 2006).  
3 The Proposal Visualized 
We grant that a functional unit may have more than one function. For instance, for the 
stomach we can distinguish at least: Function 1: to break down the chyme and 
Function 2: to move the broken-down chyme into the duodenum. Typical functions of 
other parts are: to store (something), to pump, to protect, to produce, to open, to close, 
to absorb, and to expel. The terminology of Function 1, Function 2, etc., as we use it 
in what follows, does not imply any ranking of functions in order of importance. It is 
designed merely to provide a reminder of the complex array of different kinds of 
dependence, support and regulation relations which can be detected in the different 
constituent functions of a complex organism like the human being. 
We can distinguish a first level of spatial-functional parts of the human body as in 
the figure below. 
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The Human Body (Function 1: to preserve the life of the organism): 
Circulatory  
system 
Alimentary  
system 
Respiratory  
system 
Senso-motoric 
system 
Excretory 
system 
Immune 
system 
Musculoskeletal 
system 
Vegetative regulation 
system 
Integumentary 
system 
Figure 1. Spatial-functional parts of the human body   
Figure 1 makes visible those parts of the body to which constituent functions can 
be assigned relative to the function of the human body as a whole. Each of these parts 
makes a necessary contribution to the short-term preservation of the organism’s life 
(Smith et al., 2004). It is, as it were, a window on reality. But as we shall see, it is a 
window of a special sort, which can give way to nine other windows that offer finer 
grained views on their respective part of the same reality via what we can think of as a 
process of ontological zooming (Bittner and Smith, 2001). Figure 2 provides the result 
of zooming in on the circulatory system:  
The Circulatory System (Function 1: to transport substances between bodily 
systems): 
Circulatory 
fluids 
Vessel 
system Heart 
Figure 2. Spatial-functional parts of the circulatory system 
We have identified only one main function of the circulatory system. However, we 
think that the alimentary system has at least two functions: Function 1: to absorb 
nutrients from food and Function 2: to expel non-nutrients that come from food. 
Zooming in first on the vessel system (Figure 3) and then on the heart (Figure 4) 
reveals: 
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The Vessel System (Function 1: to direct fluids in the body): 
Blood vessel system Lymphatic vessel system 
Figure 3. Spatial-functional parts of the vessel system 
The Heart (Function 1: to pump blood within the blood-vessel system): 
Atria Ventricles Valves 
Figure 4. Spatial-functional parts of the heart 
By continuing to zoom in on ever smaller parts, one can zoom down, through the 
cell and its major spatial-functional parts, down to (functional) biological 
macromolecules. In this way we can arrive at branches through a tree of successively 
smaller spatial-functional parts such as the following: 
 
(1) human body Æ circulatory system Æ vessel system Æ blood vessel system 
Æ arterial system Æ macrovasculature Æ tunica intima Æ endothelial cells; 
 
(2) human body Æ alimentary system Æ stomach Æ tunica mucosa Æ surface 
epithelium Æ endocrine cells. 
 
Both the number of spatial-functional parts of a single functional entity within the 
locus of the human body, and also the number of levels of such parts between the 
human body as a whole and its macromolecules, seem to be a matter of contingent 
fact. Thus there seems to be no general laws that predetermine how many spatial-
functional parts an organism has in total. 
The human body and all its spatial-functional parts – its function-bearers at 
successive layers – retain their identity through time. In philosophical jargon, they 
endure. This means that they are contrasted ontologically with their respective lives, 
or histories, which do not endure but rather unfold themselves through time in 
successive temporal parts or phases. The same opposition exists also on the side of the 
corresponding functions in themselves. Each person’s circulatory system has at any 
moment in time the function to transport substances between bodily systems. The 
heart at its center has at any moment in time the function to pump blood within the 
blood-vessel system. Such functions, too, are endurants, and are to be contrasted with 
their functionings. The latter are processes, subject to a division into temporal parts, 
as is illustrated for example by the cyclical functional activity of the heart, where each 
cycle contains two bona fide parts: a diastolic phase and a systolic phase. We regard 
the distinction between functions and functionings (Johansson, 2004), with their 
radically distinct ways of existing in time, as an important element of our taxonomic 
proposal.  
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The kinds of temporal parts comprehended by any given functional activity can 
now be added to the relevant figure. In the case of the heart, this would yield a 
diagram as follows: 
The Heart (Functioning of Function 1):  
Diastolic phase Systolic phase 
Figure 5. Temporal parts of the functioning of the heart  
Of course, many bodily processes, unlike the functional activity of the heart, 
feature actual rest phases (see end of section 4).  
As in the case of our zooming in on spatial-functional parts, so also here: a 
zooming in on e.g. the diastolic phase of the heart’s functioning will reveal smaller 
temporal parts of this phase. 
4 The Proposal as a Partonomic-Taxonomic Formula  
We now introduce the idea of a taxonomic formula. All the classical biological 
classifications of sexually reproducing species, which extend downwards from 
kingdom via phylum/division, class, order, family, and genus to species, might be said 
to be constructed according to the taxonomic formula: “Define species by means of 
interbreeding, then order all the species by means of relations of similarity and 
dissimilarity into a hierarchy of taxa.” A similar taxonomic formula for Mendeleev’s 
original periodic table might read: “The physical and chemical properties of the 
elements are in periodic co-variation with increasing atomic weights; order the 
elements on this basis into rows and columns.”  
We shall see that the presentation in section 3 is based both on a partonomic-
taxonomic formula concerned with spatial-functional parts and their functions and on 
a complementary formula concerned with the temporal parts of the functionings of 
these functions.  
The first and basic formula focuses on spatial-functional parts as they exist in 
prototypical human organisms at an arbitrary point in time. It might therefore be 
called a SNAP (for ‘snapshot’) taxonomic formula (or SNAP formula, for short). 
Since the second formula takes account of temporal extension, it may be called a 
timeSPAN taxonomic formula (or SPAN formula, for short) (Grenon and Smith, 
2004). The formulae read as follows: 
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SNAP 
(a) In the functional unit A, 
(b) one function of the spatial part and functional subunit B of A is: 
(c) to F in relation to X, Y, Z, etc. 
SPAN 
(d) This function (F) has as temporal parts of its functioning 
(e) the phases P1 to Pn. 
 
Since we are talking about a prototypical organism (see also 5.3 below) we do not 
need, here, to take care of parts that take on some function or other as it were 
accidentally or as a result of special circumstances.  
Our SNAP formula can be used both iteratively and recursively. That is, it can 
be applied iteratively to all the different parts of a functional unit that belong to the 
same level, and it can be repeated recursively in the sense that – in keeping with our 
examples of zooming, above – a subunit on level (b) in the SNAP formula is in the 
next cycle turned into a unit on level (a), and so forth. Examples are: 
(a) In the human body (A), 
(b) one function of the circulatory system (B) is: 
(c) to transport substances (F) between the bodily systems (X, Y, Z, etc.). 
(d) This function (F) has as temporal parts of its functioning  
(e) either fiat parts of the continuous fluid flow or bona fide parts demarcated 
through the substances transported. 
And: 
(a) In the circulatory system (B), 
(b) one function of the heart (C) is: 
(c) to pump blood (F) within the blood vessel system (X). 
(d) This function (F) has in its functioning as temporal parts 
(e) cycles, divided into the diastolic (P1) and the systolic (P2). 
Lines (a) and (b) reflect the requirement that nothing can be a constituent function if it 
is not the function of some part of a larger functional unit. (Intrinsic functions, 
whether they exist or not, do not fit our first formula.) A recursive use of the SNAP 
formula does not imply that the initial unit A disappears; it means only that A drops 
out of the foreground. For B remains a subunit of A; similarly, C remains a subunit of 
B; and so on. 
Our formulae allow that some of the partonomic paths between the main organ 
systems and macromolecules will run through more levels of spatial-functional parts 
than others. In the general SNAP formula, line (c) says that the function of a certain 
entity is: to F in relation to X, Y, Z. Here, F is a variable for functions (depicted by 
verb phrases – to pump blood, and so on), and the variables X, Y, and Z range over 
entities on every possible level along any given partonomic path. No level constraints 
are mentioned in clause (c). But if such constraints are found, the formula can easily 
be adjusted in this respect. 
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It should also be noted that the formulae completely disregard the issues which 
arise when an organ ceases to be a constituent of the relevant larger whole. We might 
say both that hearts which, during heart transplantations, are in a solution outside any 
bodily host and hearts which, during open-heart surgeries, are replaced by a heart-
lung machine have their function only potentially. But we can ignore such cases since 
the formulae apply only to functions of entities that are in fact parts of larger 
functional units. Surgery apart, in a living body the heart always has its function 
actually. This would hold even if, counterfactually, its functioning, like the 
functionings of a number of glands, contained various kinds of passive phases such as 
rest phases, waiting phases, guarding phases, and so on. It is one thing for a part or 
system to have a function only potentially and therefore not to be functioning for this 
reason, and it is something quite different for it to have a function actually and to be 
functioning, but only in the sense that, so to speak, it is on duty without needing to do 
anything.  
At any given time and for any given entity E and kind of function F, one of the 
following four possibilities must obtain: 
(i)   E neither actually nor potentially has the function F. 
(ii) E has the function F only potentially. 
(iii) E has the function F actually, but E is in a passive phase in relation to F. 
(iv) E has the function F actually, and E is an active phase in relation to F. 
When E is in a passive phase, it still has the disposition to act in the way required in 
the active phase. When E only potentially has the F, it may not have such a 
disposition. 
5 Some Features of the Formulae 
Some more words about the proposed SNAP-SPAN formulae are necessary in order 
to make some of their features clear. 
5.1 Sharing spatial-functional parts 
When, in non-evolutionary taxonomies of species, one goes downward from level A 
to level B to level C, and so forth, it is usually required that no classificatory 
“diamonds” (Figure 6) should arise.  
A1 
B1                                B2 
                                                              C1 
Figure 6.  Classificatory diamond 
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Our SNAP formula, on the other hand, gives rise to diamond structures. This is due to 
the fact that it is a partonomic-taxonomic formula, and partonomies may well contain 
diamonds. Several parts of the human body are spatial-functional parts of two or more 
larger functional units. For instance, for the oropharynx it holds true that: 
 
(a) In the alimentary system, 
(b) function 1 of the oropharynx is: 
(c) to make possible food transport 
from the oral cavity to the 
esophagus. 
(a) In the respiratory system, 
(b) function 1 of the oropharynx is: 
(c) to make possible gas transport 
between the nasal-oral cavities and 
the larynx. 
  
(a) In the oropharynx, 
(b) function 1 of the tunica 
muscularis is: 
(c) to move food into the 
esophagus. 
(a) In the oropharynx, 
(b) function 1 of the pharyngeal cavity 
is: 
(c) to direct the flow of air. 
Figure 7. Partonomic-taxonomic loci for the oropharynx 
This means that we can construct the following diamond, where each line (taken in an 
upward direction) means “is a spatial-functional part of”:  
Human body 
  Alimentary system                 Respiratory system 
                                                      Oropharynx 
Figure 7.  Sharing of spatial-functional part (oropharynx) 
Another instance of this kind of part-sharing is afforded by the liver, which belongs to 
both the alimentary system and the immune system, and almost certainly to other 
systems as well. 
Part-sharing allows for the easy integration of discoveries of new joint functions of 
already known spatial-functional parts.  
5.2 Multi-Functionality Proper 
It is sometimes taken for granted that nature has worked in such a way that one 
spatial-functional part can have only one function in relation to one larger functional 
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unit. Our taxonomic formulae make no such presumption. We do not say “the 
function of B in A is,” but rather “one function of B in A is.” Even within one and the 
same functional unit a specific spatial-functional part may have more than one 
function. For instance: 
In the alimentary system,
function 1 of the liver is: 
to produce glycogen. 
In the alimentary system,
function 2 of the liver is: 
to produce bile. 
5.3 Prototypicality 
It is here taken for granted that an entity that has a constituent function can be 
functioning better or worse, but that those functionings named in our formulae 
correspond to the well-functioning cases. Thus the latter might be called prototypical. 
This does not mean that we think that degrees of functioning can be plotted along 
some single dimension (indeed, we think that this is impossible). Nonetheless, one 
may speak in a loose sense of a “distance” between a given token example of 
functioning and the corresponding prototypical functioning. One kind of zero point is 
reached when an entity not only functions badly but starts to malfunction; an absolute 
zero point is of course reached when the entity in question can no longer function at 
all.  
We do not regard the functions designated under the heading ‘Function X’ as being 
the only possible prototypical functions. A certain functioning may well be related to 
a number of different prototypes.  
In the philosophy of the natural sciences, if not in the natural sciences themselves, 
concepts involving the feature of prototypicality have often been regarded as 
scientifically “immature.” Our proposal, however, is based on the view that this is 
wrong (Johansson, 2004). Our functional anatomy is meant to be a canonical anatomy 
in the sense of Rosse and Mejino (2003). It deals with the general structure of the 
normal or idealized human body and is to be distinguished from a range of specialized 
disciplines which deal with non-normal cases and individual organisms. 
6 Background Ideas in the Life Sciences and in Philosophy 
The taxonomic SNAP-SPAN formula we have presented has grown out of general 
ideas that have been debated for some time in both the life sciences and philosophy. 
Let us present some of them. 
 11 
6.1 Three-Level Granularity 
All of the life sciences contain, explicitly or implicitly, ideas about hierarchical 
systems, about levels of functionality, and about granularity. Our proposal comes 
close to the idea defended by researchers such as Stanley Salthe (1985, pp. 75ff) and 
D.W. McShea and E.P. Venit (2001, p. 271), who have argued that three such levels 
should be taken into account. This is because a constituent function (F) is on our view 
related always to at least three entities. The smallest possible taxonomic unit in 
functional anatomy, we repeat, has the structure:  
(a) In the functional unit A, 
(b) one function of the spatial part and functional subunit B of A is: 
(c) to F in relation to X, Y, Z, etc. 
Here, what is designated by F is related to its bearer (B), a functional whole (A), and 
at least one entity in relation to which it causes something to happen (X). B, here, 
designates in every case an entity that belongs to a lower level of granularity than 
those designated by A, but we have not required that, similarly, entities designated by 
X, Y, and Z belong to an adjacent level that is still lower. However, when this is in 
fact the case, then our formula conforms to the three-level requirement argued for by 
Salthe, McShea, and Venit. 
6.2 Scientific Non-Darwinian Functions  
The general suspicion that teleological notions should not be used in the natural 
sciences emerged from the rise of modern physics; Descartes is only the most famous 
protagonist for this view. Later, the Darwinian revolution enabled biologists to 
replace teleological notions such as design of species by the more scientifically 
defensible natural selection of species. Nonetheless, biologists and physicians have 
continued to speak of functions – which has made a number of twentieth-century 
philosophers of science uncomfortable. Their solution has been to claim that such 
modern function talk is innocent, because it can always be translated into equivalent, 
but more cumbersome, talk about causes, dispositions, adaptations, and so on, though 
they have argued among themselves about what the exact translation should look like. 
Classical “etiological analyses” include those of Larry Wright (1973) and Ruth 
Millikan (1989). (For overviews see Peter Melander (1997) and Mark Perlman 
(2004). For criticisms and alternatives see Christopher Boorse (1976, 2002) and 
Robert Cummins (1975, 2002); for more good criticism, see also Richard Manning 
(1997).) 
Such etiological approaches presuppose that all function talk is explanatory talk; 
so that the function of A is referred to only in order to explain why A exists. Our 
attempt to defend a natural-scientific concept of function under the heading of 
“constituent function” rejects this presupposition. In conformity with the views of 
Cummins and Boorse, we insist that much function talk is either purely descriptive or 
explains how something works when it exists.  
As already indicated, our view comes close to Cummins’s so-called “intrasystemic 
role analysis” (Melander 1997, p. 51) and to Boorse’s “general goal-contribution 
analysis” of functions. Cummins claims: “To ascribe a function to something is to 
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ascribe a capacity to it which is singled out by its role in an analysis of some capacity 
of a containing system” (1994, p. 67; our italics); and Boorse analyzes “functions as 
causal contributions to goals of a goal-directed system” (2002, p. 63). Both regard 
functions (as we do) as relational entities, but they differ from each other and from us 
in the way they look upon the whole of which a function is a part. Cummins puts no 
restrictions at all on what a “capacity of a containing system” might be, whereas 
Boorse requires that the whole be goal-directed. Boorse treats the concept of goal-
directedness as a primitive concept, and he “takes goal-directedness to be an 
objective, non-mental property of all living organisms” (2002, p. 63-64).  
In what way, then, does our approach differ from those of Cummins and Boorse? 
Mainly in these respects:  
(i) Cummins is a semantic reductionist, who tries to do away with the 
concept of function – though he still employs the concept of “role,” 
which is itself, in our eyes, a kind of function concept.  
(ii) Boorse makes his analysis depend on the existence of objective non-
mental goals, i.e., on what we have called “intrinsic functions.” 
(iii) Neither Cummins nor Boorse has noted the trilemma and objectivity 
problems mentioned in section 2, and have therefore not explained how 
their analyses differ from merely subjective ascriptions of roles and 
goals. 
Arno Wouters has claimed that it can be doubted whether philosophers’ “function 
concept has anything to do with function talk in biology and psychology,” and that 
philosophers “may easily end up with a theory that is philosophically well-founded 
but gives us no insight whatsoever into the practice of inquiry” (2003, p. 233). We 
hope that such an accusation cannot be made with regard to the concept of constituent 
function advanced above.  
6.3 Bipartite Taxonomy 
We have put forward two formulae, one for functions and one for functionings. This 
idea relates to discussions between philosophers and information scientists about so-
called “top-level ontologies” within information science; a top-level ontology 
contains a classification of the most general types of entities and relations in reality. 
From the point of view of a realist philosophy, however, most such ontologies do not 
do adequate justice to the fundamental difference between enduring entities and 
processes. Enduring entities exist as wholes in a single instant of time in a way in 
which processes cannot. Enduring entities can exist from one moment to the next; 
processes unfold in successive phases (they can be segmented into parts along the 
temporal dimension). Both enduring entities and processes belong to one and the 
same reality, our world; but they might nonetheless be said to constitute two different, 
albeit related, ontologies, which have been termed SNAP and SPAN, respectively 
(Grenon and Smith, 2004). In line with this duality, our taxonomic proposal presents 
functions (as enduring entities) as part of the SNAP-ontology, and functionings (as 
processes) as part of the SPAN-ontology. Conversely, the structure of our proposal 
supports the view that the difference between SNAP-entities and SPAN-entities is far 
more radical than any difference within either of these ontologies. In our proposal 
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only the SNAP formula features a hierarchical nesting of its own, and one might even 
say that the complementary SPAN formula is parasitic upon the SNAP formula. But 
both formulae are needed for an accurate representation of the functional anatomy of 
the organism.  
7 Concluding Remarks: Possible Modifications of the Formulae 
It is easily seen that the proposed taxonomic formulae allows for various kinds of 
modifications. 
7.1 Substitute Functions 
It is well known that when certain bodily organs are injured in such a way that they 
are no longer capable of performing their function, then some other spatial-functional 
part will take over. After a splenectomy, for instance, the liver takes over some of the 
spleen’s functions. In order to integrate such data, the original formulae can, and 
must, be amended with the addition of the concept of substitute functions and 
functionings (and of related concepts of plasticity and redundancy). 
7.2 Information Transmission and Regulation 
Our formulae have been worked out with the classical bodily systems in mind and 
using functions such as: to transport (something), to direct, and to pump. For the time 
being, the transmission of information and regulation, such as signal transduction and 
cell-to-cell communication, are beyond our focus. In principle, however, our formulae 
can be extended to allow for functions and functionings of these sorts also. Probably, 
such an extension is necessary in order to take care of all spatial-functional parts of 
the immune system. 
7.3 Disease Taxonomies 
As we said in section 5.3, every actually existing constituent function’s functioning 
can be more or less prototypical, and it can even be a case of malfunction. Now, given 
our defense of the concept of function, it seems to be true to say that somatic diseases 
consist either in a malfunctioning of or in a complete loss of at least one of the body’s 
constituent functions. Since every possible taxonomic formula for malfunctionings 
and every possible formula for loss of functions refers to a corresponding constituent 
function, all diseases can be related to the formulae we have put forward above. The 
disease taxonomy that is implied by this insight might thus also bring new order into 
the multifarious world of diseases. 
 14 
References: 
Bittner, T. and B. Smith (2001). Vagueness and Granular Partitions. In: Proceedings 
of the Conference on Formal Ontology in Information Systems – FOIS 2001, 
pp. 309-320. ACM Press, New York. 
 
Boorse, C. (1976), Wright on Functions. Philosophical Review 85: 70-86. 
 
Boorse, C. (2002), A Rebuttal on Functions. In: A. Ariew et al. (eds.), Functions. New 
Essays in the Philosophy of Psychology and Biology, pp. 63-112. Oxford University 
Press, Oxford. 
 
Cummins, R. (1975). Functional Analysis. In: E. Sober (ed.), Conceptual Issues in 
Evolutionary Biology, pp. 49-69. MIT Press, Cambridge. Mass., second ed. 1994; 
originally in Journal of Philosophy 72: 741-765. 
 
Cummins, R. (2002). Neo-Teleology. In: A. Ariew et al. (eds.), Functions. New 
Essays in the Philosophy of Psychology and Biology, pp. 157-172. Oxford University 
Press, Oxford. 
 
Grenon, P. and B. Smith (2004). SNAP and SPAN: Towards Dynamic Spatial 
Ontology. Spatial Cognition and Computation 4: 69-103. 
  
Johansson, I. (2004). Functions, Function Concepts, and Scales. The Monist 
86: 96-115. 
 
Johansson, I. (forthcoming 2006). The Constituent Function Analysis of Functions. 
In: H.J. Koskinen, S. Pihlström and R. Vilkko (eds.), Science – A Challenge to 
Philosophy. Papers presented at the XV Internordic Philosophical Symposium, 
Helsinki, May 2004. (Also at: http://hem.passagen.se/ijohansson/index.html.) 
 
Manning, R.N. (1997). Biological Function, Selection, and Reduction. British Journal 
for the Philosophy of Science 48: 69-82. 
 
Matthen, M. (1997). Teleology and the Product Analogy. Australasian Journal of 
Philosophy 75: 21-37. 
 
McShea, D.W. and E.P. Venit (2001): What Is a Part? In: Wagner and Wagner (eds.), 
The Character Concept in Evolutionary Biology, pp. 259-284. Academic Press, 
London,  
 
Melander, P. (1997). Analyzing Functions. An Essay on a Fundamental Notion in 
Biology. Almkvist & Wiksell International, Stockholm.  
 
Millikan, R.G. (1989). In Defence of Proper Functions. Philosophy of Science 
56: 288-302. 
 
 15 
Perlman, M. (2004), The Modern Philosophical Resurrection of Teleology. The 
Monist 86: 3-51. 
 
Rosse, C. and J.L. Mejino Jr. (2003). A reference ontology for biomedical 
informatics: the Foundational Model of Anatomy. Journal of Biomedical Informatics 
36: 478-500. 
 
Salthe, S.S. (1985). Evolving Hierarchical Systems. Their Structure and 
Representation. Columbia University Press, New York. 
 
Searle, J. (1995), The Construction of Social Reality. The Free Press, New York. 
 
Smith, B. (2001). Fiat Objects. Topoi  20: 131–148.  
 
Smith, B., K. Munn, and I. Papakin (2004). Bodily Systems and the Spatial-
Functional Structure of the Human Body. In: D. Pisanelli and M. Domenico (eds.), 
Ontologies in Medicine: Proceedings of the Workshop on Medical Ontologies, Rome, 
October 2003, pp. 39-63. IOS Press, Amsterdam. 
 
Wouters, A. (2003). Essay Review: Philosophers on Function. Acta Biotheoretica 
51: 223-235. 
 
Wright, L. (1973). Functions. In: E. Sober (ed.), Conceptual Issues in Evolutionary 
Biology, pp. 27-47. MIT Press, Cambridge. Mass., 1994; originally in Philosophical 
Review 82: 139-168. 
Acknowledgements: 
For comments on earlier versions of this paper we would like to thank Pierre Grenon, 
Bert Klagges, Anand Kumar, Igor Papakin, and two anonymous referees. The paper 
was written under the auspices of the Wolfgang Paul Program of the Alexander von 
Humboldt Foundation, the European Union Network of Excellence on Medical 
Informatics and Semantic Data Mining, and the Volkswagen Foundation under the 
auspices of the project “Forms of Life.” 
 16 
